PERFORMANCE INCENTIVE FUNDING
America's tough-on-crime sentencing policies are often cited as the primary reason the United States has the highest incarceration rate in the world. Yet there is another contributing factor that is often overlooked: a structural flaw in the way most states fund their criminal justice systems that discourages local decision makers from supervising offenders in the community and makes it easier to send them to prison.
It is the state corrections agency that bears the cost of incarcerating people in prison. However, both the decision to send an offender to prison and the cost of keeping an offender in the community almost always rest with a different state agency or a local jurisdiction. This is true for either a new conviction or a revocation from probation or parole. In the eyes of local decision makers and in cases involving low-level offenders, sending someone to prison is all too often the preferred option because it saves the actual expense of supervision and avoids the political cost should an offender commit a serious crime while in the community.
Because of ongoing state budget deficits and decades of prison population growth, state policymakers have recently begun to focus attention on this misalignment of fiscal and operational responsibility by devising solutions that make system actors more accountable and collaborative. Since 2003, eight states have enacted legislation creating performance incentive funding (PIF) programs that aim to align the interests of the state corrections agency and local decision makers.
PIF programs are premised on the idea that if the supervision agency or locality sends fewer low-level offenders to prison-thereby causing the state to incur fewer costs-some portion of the state savings should be shared with the agency or locality. With PIF, agencies or localities receive a financial reward for delivering fewer prison commitments through reduced recidivism and revocations that, in turn, must be reinvested into evidence-based programs in the community.
In September 2011, the Vera Institute of Justice, the Pew Center on the States, and Metropolis Strategies brought together more than 50 practitioners from the states that have enacted or were considering PIF legislation. In addition to outlining how PIF programs can lead to better offender outcomes while reducing overall corrections costs, this report discusses seven key challenges and tasks, identified by summit participants, that a state must address when designing and implementing a PIF program: (1) choosing an administrative structure, (2) selecting a funding mechanism, (3) deciding whether to provide seed funding, (4) selecting outcome measures, (5) determining baseline measures, (6) estimating savings, and (7) engaging stakeholders.
The report suggests that including multiple measures to evaluate performance and determine eligibility for incentive funding, rather than focusing on just the single outcome of reduced prison commitments, will ensure that public safety is protected while positive outcomes are still achieved. This report also highlights the importance of incorporating evidence-based practices into the incentive funding structure and providing agencies and localities with the resources and support they need to pursue the program's goals.
A successful PIF program can significantly curb prison population growth and costs while increasing public safety:
in the first year of its PIF program, California experienced a 23-percent drop in prison commitments of felony probationers, and $88 million of the savings was distributed to county probation agencies. Most important, PIF can transform public safety by contributing to a reduction in recidivism, crime, and revocation rates. 
Executive Summary
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Introduction
Policymakers and scholars cite a wide range of reasons why the United States is the world's leading incarcerator. Two decades of high violent crime rates until the mid-1990s, the shuttering of mental health facilities in the 1980s and continuing today, and federal subsidy of state prison construction in the 1990s are often prime suspects. The chief culprit, however, is generally acknowledged to be the cumulative impact of hundreds of policy decisions by state and federal leaders that increased criminal sentences and restricted release from prison.
There is another driver fueling prison growth that has been largely overlooked: a structural flaw in the U.S. criminal justice system that incentivizes probation and parole agencies and courts to put struggling low-level offenders behind bars. public safety outcomes, require reporting and monitoring of performance measures, and provide financial rewards to agencies or localities for positive results.
Of the eight states that currently have laws creating PIF programs for adult offenders, five have passed PIF enabling legislation within the last three years. 14 As the chart on pages 8-9 demonstrates, there is similarity among the programs but also many differences. There is no one-size-fitsall approach to designing or implementing a PIF program. The next section of this report discusses seven key issues that state and local policymakers should consider when designing and implementing PIF programs.
Key Considerations in Designing and Implementing a PIF Program
The summit on performance incentive funding, held in September 2011, brought together more than 50 practitioners from states that have enacted or were considering PIF legislation. Discussions among participants identified a number of common challenges that must be confronted and tasks that must be achieved by states that seek to establish a successful program. This section discusses seven key challenges and tasks.
CHOOSE AN ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE
An initial consideration when designing a PIF program is selecting the state-level entity responsible for administering the program. This entity is more than just an administrator-it will be responsible for holding the agencies or localities accountable in meeting the outcome measures, reviewing their performance reports, and determining the amount of the fiscal reward. 
SELECT A FUNDING MECHANISM
The existing PIF programs use either a grant-based, outcome-based, or hybrid model to determine how much funding a supervision agency or local entity will receive once it achieves the specified positive outcomes.
Grant-Based Model. Two of the eight states (Illinois and Kansas) employ a grant-based model in which the community corrections entities submit to the state administrative entity grant applications that set forth the activities they propose to undertake to achieve specified outcomes. The amount of funding received is based on these applications. A state choosing to adopt the grant-based model needs to:
1. Develop an application template.
2. Decide whether the program will operate statewide or in selected pilot sites; if the latter, then a selection process is also needed.
3. Determine whether the amount of incentive funding will be determined by a formula, negotiated separately with each participating jurisdiction, or some other mechanism. Funding. Under the grant-based model, the amount of funding awarded depends upon the jurisdiction's plan or grant application and its ultimate success in achieving proposed or mandated outcomes. In Illinois, upon submission of a local plan, the site is eligible for a grant of up to $1 million (based on population) to fund a 15-18 month program.
A state must decide whether to distribute some or all of the grant proceeds to the grantee upfront in order to assist the grantee in meeting those outcomes, and, if so, whether to establish a mechanism to recoup such funds should the grantee fail to achieve the agreed upon outcomes.
In Illinois, for example, the oversight board develops a reimbursement provision that will be levied against a local jurisdiction that fails to reach the reduced number of prison commitments stipulated in its plan. receive payments to the extent they achieve the results mandated in the PIF legislation. 17 The incentive payment is both a reward for past performance and an investment in continued improvement.
The payment calculation or formula is set out in the enabling legislation and consists of a percentage of the state savings resulting from the agency's performance. In California, payments to local jurisdictions are automatically built into the state's annual budget process. In South Carolina, the state oversight agency must make a recommendation to the legislature whether to appropriate up to 35 percent of the state savings to the community corrections agency. Arkansas mandates that pilot jurisdictions will receive 50 percent of any averted state costs.
While a state choosing to adopt the outcome-based model has fewer decisions to make in terms of the funding mechanism, it may still engage in a selection process to determine which agencies will participate. For instance, the legislation in Kentucky and Arkansas authorizes a limited number of pilot sites, and selection of such sites may take place through a competitive application process. However, after selection, eligibility for funding depends solely on the extent to which the locality or supervision agency achieves the prescribed performance measures and outcomes, with the amount awarded determined by a formula based on reduced prison commitments and the resulting state savings.
Hybrid Model. Texas and Ohio employ a hybrid of the grant-based and outcome-based models. Local supervision agencies in these states are eligible for some upfront funding as well as funding based on achieving certain outcomes. They are also required to submit applications or plans.
In Ohio, local agencies submit applications and receive probation improvement grants, which are used to enhance services. They are also eligible for incentive funding, which is awarded if they achieve agreed-upon performance measures. In Texas, local community supervision and corrections departments submit to the administering agency Commitment Reduction Plans, which set forth a target number by which the counties propose to reduce the number of people committed to state prison or the number of community supervision revocations. The PIF program provides grantees with initial lump sum payments in the amount of 35 percent of their plan's estimated state savings. However, should they fall short of their targets, grantees pledge to repay a portion of their grants.
PROVIDE SEED FUNDING
Some programs provide seed funding to help supervision agencies or local jurisdictions begin implementing or enhancing the evidence-based practices shown to produce improved outcomes. For example:
> Illinois provided planning grants of up to $30,000 to the 10 pilot sites to convene stakeholders, analyze data, and complete a local plan.
IMPROVING OUTCOMES
While PIF programs differ from state to state, practitioners at the summit were in unanimous agreement that in order to achieve better public safety outcomes, jurisdictions must develop specific strategies for reducing recidivism and revocation rates. This generally means developing and implementing supervision and treatment programs that embrace basic principles of evidence-based practices in community corrections.
EIGHT EVIDENCE-BASED PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE INTERVENTIONS a
Research over the past two decades demonstrates that jurisdictions that implement policies and programs that are consistent with the following principles are more likely to reduce recidivism and improve public safety: e. Integrate treatment into sentence and sanction requirements.
4. Train staff in skills that can influence behavior change (e.g., motivational interviewing and social learning theory). (2) reducing officer caseload;
and (3) Monitoring programs are also useful in this regard. In the juvenile Redeploy Illinois program, because the desired statutory outcome was to reduce the number of youth sent to state facilities by 25 percent, there was concern that local jurisdictions might avoid a state commitment by incarcerating youth in local facilities for longer periods of time. To address this concern, university-based evaluators and the Illinois Criminal Justice
Information Authority monitor variations in the detention populations in the pilot sites. Additionally, members of the oversight board go into the field to discuss these issues with local stakeholders. 
DETERMINE BASELINE MEASURES
In addition to determining what outcomes to measure, a state must consider how to measure those outcomes. A key challenge is constructing an appropriate baseline against which to compare post-PIF outcomes. The "There have to be consequences, both positive and negative, for offender behavior. Offenders are now revoked when they need to be, but not under circumstances where there is a probability of success with appropriate treatment and supervision."
CALIFORNIA ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS
Interview by Vera Institute of Justice, January 2012
number of probation and parole revocations, for example, can go up and down as a result of having more or fewer offenders under supervision.
The influence of such year-to-year variations can be avoided by using a baseline rate consisting of the percentage of offenders under supervision during the preceding three to five years who were revoked to state prison.
In addition, using a baseline rate reduces the pressure on agencies to dramatically improve their performance year to year and can measure their success in comparison with an average over several years.
The risk of using a rolling rather than stationary baseline can lead to a program becoming a victim of its own success. The juvenile Redeploy Accordingly, the realignment legislation contained a provision directing that a revised baseline formula be developed "that takes into consideration the significant changes to the eligibility of some felony probationers for revocation to the state prison resulting from the implementation of the 2011 public safety realignment." Finally, in addition to determining how best to measure selected outcomes, policymakers need to consider the availability of relevant data, upon whom the data reporting responsibilities should be placed, and the timing and frequency of reporting.
States should examine what information is currently being collected and ask whether those data are sufficient for measuring success in achieving the desired outcomes. States must balance the need and desire for data with time and resource constraints at both the state and local level. In Illinois, a customized database was designed to collect performance measures noted in the PIF legislation as well as measures specific to each jurisdiction. If PIF outcomes require collection of new data, policymakers might consider discontinuing some current data collection activities in order to reduce administrative burdens on staff.
ESTIMATE SAVINGS
In most cases, the PIF incentive payments are drawn from and calculated as a percentage of the state corrections savings resulting from the positive outcomes achieved by the agencies. 26 For instance, the PIF legislation in Arkansas dictates that pilot sites will receive 50 percent of averted state costs; and in South Carolina, the community supervision agency may receive up to 35 percent of state savings. In Ohio, while the incentive payment of $1,800 for each reduced prison commitment (compared to the previous year) was based in part on a percentage of the state's cost of housing an offender, it was also tied to the cost of keeping someone in the community as well as available funds. In all cases, PIF programs must accurately estimate the state budgetary savings that result from successful operation of the PIF program.
It is important that the state consider which agency should be responsible for calculating state savings, how to measure the savings, and whether to specify the manner of calculation of savings in the legislation. 
ENGAGE STAKEHOLDERS
Improving public safety outcomes is not a goal that the legislature, gov- 
ENDNOTES
The existing PIF programs are in various stages of implementation, and each state has followed its own path in light of the unique features of its governmental structure and processes. However, all of the existing PIF programs share common goals and objectives, are based on the same fundamental framework, rely on the same principles of performance and accountability, mandate the use of evidence-based practices, and utilize an innovative, incentive-based funding mechanism.
At a time when states across the country continue to grapple with high offender recidivism and revocation rates, tight state corrections budgets, and under-funded community corrections programs, PIF programs hold great promise as a method to ensure that community corrections agencies or local jurisdictions receive much needed funding, states trim prison costs, and the public enjoys safer communities.
All sources cited here can be accessed online at www.vera.org/pif/bibliography 16 The reimbursement provision is a last resort after corrective action has been negotiated between the local jurisdiction and the oversight board. 24 The oversight board considers a modification of the metrics only after a jurisdiction achieves such dramatic reductions. 25 California Assembly Bill 117 (2011-12) . County probation data reported to the California Administrative Office of the Courts for the first quarter of 2012 indicate that 49 percent of felony probationers revoked to incarceration were revoked to prison (51 percent were revoked to jail). If that percentage holds for the rest of 2012, the size of state savings and resulting 2013 incentive payments to county probation departments will be reduced accordingly. Absent further legislative or administrative change, however, it is anticipated that the size of future financial payments will continue to provide a strong incentive to local probation agencies to maintain and further reduce revocation rates among felony probationers subject to revocation to prison.
26 The exceptions are Kansas and Illinois, which determine the grant amounts based on the county's request included in its comprehensive plan.
27 Variable costs include expenses such as food, clothing, and medical care.
Step-fixed costs include staff salaries and benefits when prison capacity is reduced enough to reduce staffing (for example, if a housing unit closes). When states close prisons or parts of prisons, only the marginal cost can be eliminated. The marginal cost is composed of variable costs, and, if prison capacity is reduced sufficiently, step-fixed costs. The marginal cost is lower than the average cost, which also includes the fixed costs of operating prisons (such as debt service and central administration 31 In Illinois, the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority compiled relevant data for local jurisdictions and made it available to planning committees through the program's website.
32 While this was a liability at the county or judicial circuit level, the penalty was an asset at the state level in passing the legislation. Policymakers were eager to have leverage to ensure that local jurisdictions performed as they were mandated.
